eCommons@AKU
Book Chapters

January 2010

Re-imagining the nature of development:
Biodiversity conservation and pastoral visions in
the Northern Areas, Pakistan
Nosheen Ali
Aga Khan University, nosheen.ali@aku.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Other Education Commons, Regional Sociology Commons, Social and Cultural
Anthropology Commons, and the Social and Philosophical Foundations of Education Commons
Recommended Citation
Copyright 2010 from Contesting Development: Critical struggles for social change edited by Philip McMichael. Reproduced
by permission of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a division of informa plc.
Ali, N. (2010). Re-imagining the nature of development: Biodiversity conservation and pastoral visions in the Northern Areas,
Pakistan. In P. McMichael (Ed.), Contesting development: Critical struggles for social change (pp. 64–80). New York: Routledge.

5.
RE-IMAGINING THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT

Biodiversity Conservation and Pastoral Visions in the Northern
Areas, Pakistan
Nosheen Ali
Examines how, in the mountainous village of Shimshal, national parks and
“community-based” conservation projects such as trophy hunting are deeply
problematic, promoting exploitive ideologies of nature and development while delegitimizing the values and rights of pastoralists. The Shimshalis have creatively
resisted the appropriations of their land by creating a Shimshal Nature Trust,
implementing a model of ecological sovereignty instead of “community
participation”—challenging the very logic of protected areas in international
conservation.
Introduction

Over the last thirty years, almost 40 percent of the territory of the Northern Areas in
Pakistan has been converted into government-owned protected areas, in the form of national
parks, wildlife sanctuaries, game reserves, and hunting areas. Indeed, it is not unusual to
hear that state authorities wish to transform the biodiversity-rich Northern Areas into a
“living museum” for wildlife. This vision has been critically supported and shaped by
international conservation NGOs, particularly the International Union for the Conservation
of Nature (IUCN) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), both of which have a
major presence in the region.
In this chapter, I explore the conflicts and contestations that such a vision of conservation
has generated in lived practice. My focus is on the trajectory of the very first experiment
embracing this vision—the Khunjerab National Park (KNP) that was founded in 1975—as
well as more recent community-based conservation programs of international trophy
hunting that have become popular in Northern Pakistan. I examine two key questions: First,
what are the ideals and ideologies that underpin the projects of biodiversity conservation in
the Northern Areas? And second, how and why do local communities in the region—
specifically the pastoral villagers of Shimshal in the case of the KNP—critique and contest
the practices of global conservation?
I argue that national parks in Northern Pakistan as well as more recent community-based
conservation approaches are deeply problematic, as they are contingent on relinquishing the
very land and livelihood on which pastoral communities are founded. Such projects often
assume that practices of local societies pose a key threat to nature, instead of

acknowledging that nature is embedded in social relations and cannot be protected without
recognizing indigenous values, rights, and ownership. Further, conservation projects such as
trophy hunting have introduced a market calculus in the management of nature, by
commodifying it for elite, mostly Western tourists. These projects are framed as initiatives
for “sustainable development,” but in effect, they have served to entrench the power of the
state and capital over local ecologies and communities.
Faced with displacement and distress as a result of conservation projects, villagers of
Shimshal in Northern Pakistan have responded with courage and creativity, and hitherto
managed to protect their homes and pastures from being seized in the name of global
conservation. They have done this by creating a Shimshal Nature Trust (SNT)—which has
established indigenous ownership and management of Shimshali ancestral land to counter
its appropriation by the Khunjerab National Park. A biodiversity hotspot owned and
managed entirely by a local community has long been considered unthinkable in global
conservation practice, which mandates that the territory be owned by state authorities and
managed primarily by national and international conservation agencies. The villagers of
Shimshal have hence challenged the fundamental logic of international conservation.
While the Shimshalis have struggled against the KNP in order to protect their land and
livelihood, their struggle is especially significant for it contests the epistemic exclusion of
pastoral visions from the very definition of development. It challenges the dominant
meanings of “nature” and “conservation” in global environmental practice, questions whose
knowledge counts as “expertise,” and recasts the very process through which “global”
development ideals and projects are framed and terms of “community participation”
defined. By creating a Shimshal Nature Trust which proposes indigenous ownership of
local land and ecology—as opposed to a national park or revenue-sharing conservation
schemes—Shimshalis engage in what Jean Franco has called the “struggle for interpretive
power” (1999). This involves active appropriation and new repertoires of representation
through which marginalized communities carve a space of maneuver within dominant
paradigms (Pratt, 1999; Cornwall, Harrison, & Whitehead, 2007). Shimshalis have to
strategically represent and position themselves in relation to conservation, in order to claim
voice and value, and simply to survive. Simultaneously, they puncture the epistemic
privilege through which state and international institutions construct particular visions of
the world as natural, and particular interests as the right, universal, and inevitable path of
progress.
From Natural Areas to Neo-Liberal Resources

The idea of a “natural protected area” such as a national park for biodiversity conservation
emerged from an ahistorical construction of nature, in which nature was viewed as a
pristine, peopleless wilderness instead of a lived social landscape (Cronon, 1995). Inspired
by Enlightenment and Romantic values, this imagined wilderness had to be created,
scientifically managed, preserved, and toured—primarily by urbanites for their own use and

luxury. Such valuations of nature emerged in the context of an ongoing unfolding of liberal
capitalist modernity, which produced the “natural” and the “social” as separate and distinct
realms of existence. The social alienation and environmental degradation resulting from the
process of capitalist development was partly the reason behind the conservationist impulse
to find and preserve “untouched” and “endangered” nature—untouched by and endangered
from capital.
The nature–society relation has undergone significant changes under recent conditions of
neo-liberal capitalism. To begin with, nature has been transformed from a factor of
production external to capital into a commodity that itself must be bought and sold
according to the dictates of capital (O’Connor, 1994). In practice, this commodification of
nature has been achieved through the institutionalization of tradable pollution permits,
transferable fishing quotas, intellectual property rights over crop varieties, the privatization
of public utilities, and other such market-based mechanisms for managing nature. Far from
the claims of “efficient” and “sustainable” use, these practices in effect deepen the
exploitation of natural resources and heighten the inequities characterizing their access.
Countries in the Global South, and particularly their indigenous communities, which
depend directly on natural resources, tend to lose out the most, as their rights and use values
are delegitimized to make way for the interests and exchange values of global elites.
In the specific arena of biodiversity conservation, neo-liberal values have steadily
encroached and become dominant over the last thirty years. In the 1970s, the protected area
model and its conception of nature as divorced from society began to come under severe
criticism for being exclusionary and ineffective, both from within the conservation
community as well as from rural communities whose rights were being superseded by the
imperatives of biodiversity preservation. By the early 90s, a series of conferences such as
the 1982 and 1992 World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas (WCNPPA) as
well as the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, had decisively transformed the discourse
on biodiversity conservation against the “island mentality” (McNeely, 1993) that had
hitherto guided the management of protected areas. The aim now was not strict
preservation, but rather conservation combined with “sustainable development.”
International conservation organizations such as the Conservation International, WWF, and
IUCN subsequently set about investigating how the goals of conservation could be achieved
while simultaneously ensuring “community participation” and “benefit-sharing.”
Part of the answer that they came up with was decidedly neo-liberal: the use of protected
areas for the promotion of market ventures such as ecotourism, trophy hunting, and
bioprospecting, which would commodify nature to serve mostly Western consumers, but
also give local communities a share in the resulting revenue. This commodification of
nature is presented as “conservation,” employing the circular logic of selling nature in order
to save it (McAfee, 1999) and saving nature in order to sell it (Breunig, 2006). It is also
presented as a form of “community-based conservation” for “sustainable development,”
while simultaneously perpetuating a protected area model of conservation that is
fundamentally anti-community: protected areas mostly convert commonly owned pastoral

and agricultural land into state-owned territory in which subsistence-based uses of nature
such as grazing and farming are severely curtailed. Frequently, indigenous communities are
altogether evicted from their lands to create the imagined “natural” landscape, leading to an
alarming number of “conservation refugees” around the world (Geisler, 2003). Indeed,
subsistence uses have become delegitimized by the very definition of “biodiversity,” which
has come to be constructed as a national and global preserve that needs to be protected
mostly from local “threats” such as “unsustainable grazing practices” (e.g., IUCN 1999, p.
31). Through such logics of protected areas as well as their neo-liberal uses, global
biodiversity conservation has opened up a new frontier for the appropriation of local space
by capital and state, thus embodying a form of what Harvey has called “accumulation by
dispossession” (2003).
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The accomplishment of this neo-liberal conservation depends critically on the discourse of
“sustainable development” and “community-based conservation.” This discourse has served
to re-legitimize the protected area model, leading to a vigorous expansion of protected
areas, particularly in the developing world. Between 1986 and 1996, there was a 60 percent
increase in the number of natural protected areas in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin
America (Breunig, 2006). While critiques of neo-liberalism often target the policies
promoted by organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, those of conservation
organizations are rarely analyzed as linked to the realization of a neo-liberal agenda. This is
partly due to the ways in which the aim of conserving biodiversity has become naturalized
as “common sense”—an abstract, global value to be aspired toward by everyone for the
sake of the earth as well as for future generations. Certainly, attention to the sustainability
of the natural world and equitable access to it is of ultimate significance, and is made
possible precisely by a language of environmental conservation that has the potential to
offer a powerful counter to an ecologically and socially destructive consumerism driven by
capitalist modernity. However, what this commonsense environmental ethic has come to
embody in actual conservation practice deserves critical study, as the latter constitutes one
of the modes through which rural livelihoods around the globe are being superseded by free
market ideologies.
The Context of the Khunjerab National Park, Northern Areas

Historically known as Gilgit-Baltistan, the region today called the Northern Areas covers a
vast terrain of some 72,496 square kilometers at the northern borders of Pakistan, India,
China, and Afghanistan. It encompasses some of the world’s highest mountain ranges, and
is incredibly rich in plant and wildlife diversity, supporting several rare and endangered
species such as the snow leopard (Uncia uncia), markhor (Capra falconeri), and Himalayan
ibex (Capra ibex siberica). This ecologically fragile region also has a tenuous political
status. It is claimed by both India and Pakistan as part of the disputed territory of Kashmir,
but it is effectively ruled by Pakistan, and constitutes 86 percent of the territory of Kashmir
under its control.

In 1975, the Northern Areas Wildlife Preservation Act was passed, under which the
Northern Areas administration could declare any area in its domain as a national park,
wildlife reserve, or wildlife sanctuary, and alter the boundaries of such areas as deemed
necessary. Through a government notification in the same year, the Khunjerab National
Park was subsequently established by the then Prime Minister, Zulfi qar Ali Bhutto, as the
first national park in the Northern Areas. The KNP covers an area of 2270 sq. km, and
comprises the grasslands of the Khunjerab, Ghujerab, and Shimshal valleys in the upper
Hunza region of the Northern Areas. During the time of princely and colonial rule, the
village communities which inhabited this area enjoyed grazing rights on its pastures and
paid livestock and livestock products as tax to the Mir, the princely ruler of Hunza. Some
pastures like that of Shimshal had been bought from the Mir and were directly owned by the
local agro-pastoral communities.
The official rationale for the KNP was the protection of the endangered Marco Polo sheep,
as well as the preservation of other Asian wildlife species such as the snow leopard, blue
sheep, and Himalayan ibex. The park was recommended and delineated by the famous
American field zoologist George B. Schaller, who was affi liated with the Wildlife
Conservation Society and visited Pakistan several times between 1970 and 1975. It was
designated as a Category II park; according to the guidelines provided by IUCN, this meant
that human activity such as grazing and hunting would be banned and visitors would be
allowed only for “inspirational, educational, cultural and recreational purposes at a level
which will maintain the area in a natural or near natural state” (IUCN, 1994).
Contesting Conservation

While all the other villages that were going to be affected by the Khunjerab National Park
eventually accepted its authority, the village of Shimshal still refuses to give up its land.
This has been a major impediment in the implementation of the KNP, as two-thirds of it is
comprised of Shimshali territory.
As the map in Figure 5.1 shows, Shimshal is located at the northeastern periphery of the
Northern Areas, along the border of Pakistan with China. It comprises about 2700 sq. km of
high altitude land in the Central Karakoram region, and is exclusively controlled by an
agro-pastoral community of approximately 1700 people. Within this area, Shimshalis
maintain several village settlements, enough irrigated land to fulfill their food requirements,
and over a dozen communal pastures for seasonal herding of their sizable livestock
population.
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Shimshalis offer a number of reasons to explain why they have been resisting the
conversion of their territory into a national park. To begin with, Shimshalis argue that the
Khunjerab National Park was created without any consultation with the affected
communities regarding its boundaries, regulations, or management. They were simply
informed that most of their pastures and even some of their village settlements were now
part of a state-owned national park.

Beyond concerns about the arbitrary and undemocratic foundation of the KNP, the main
apprehension of Shimshalis is the loss of their land and livelihood. The comunity

Exhibit 5.1 The Location of Shimshal in the Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan), Pakistan (Source: Butz
1996).

of Shimshal stands to lose the most from the park due to its exceptionally high dependence
on livestock herding as a source of livelihood. In 1995, Shimshalis owned a total of 4473
goats, 2547 sheep, 960 yaks, 399 cows, and 32 donkeys (Ali & Butz, 2003), and they
continue to have the largest livestock holdings in the Hunza region. An enforcement of park
regulations would entail a complete ban on grazing and hunting in most Shimshali pastures,
so that wildlife species and their habitats can be preserved. This would directly threaten
Shimshali livelihoods not only because of the loss of pastures, but also due to the
prohibition on hunting certain wildlife predators of livestock. As Shimshali villagers said to
me:

We are supposed to protect the snow leopard, even though it eats up our goats and sheep and
causes a huge economic loss for us. Who will compensate us for this loss? We have to pay the
price for conservation. First our rights should be honored, then those of wildlife.

These statements challenge the modernist, universalizing agenda of biodiversity
conservation that privileges the protection of wildlife for the “future of the earth” over the
protection of pastoral livelihoods and futures. For Shimshalis, conservation—as promoted
by international conservation organizations—is not of inherent value because it entails an
appropriation of their territory, and because one of the rare species that needs to be
protected is a deadly predator of livestock. Yet, to prevent their displacement by the
Khunjerab National Park, Shimshalis have themselves implemented a self-imposed ban on
wildlife hunting. As a Shimshali shepherd commented to me:
We believe in conservation. That’s why we imposed a ban on wildlife hunting ourselves 10 years
ago. In other places, if a snow leopard eats up livestock, it tends to get hunted down in a
retaliatory killing so that the helpless shepherd can recover his loss by selling the leopard’s pelt.

Indeed, Shimshalis go beyond claims of merely fulfilling the responsibilities that modern
conservation expects of them. They claim ownership of the very “nature” that external
authorities wish to conserve, by pointing out their historical role in producing this nature:
My ancestors planted the trees in Shimshal. How can someone come and tell me that these trees
do not belong to me?
The markhor (Capra falconeri) is alive because of us.

Through such claims, Shimshalis challenge the dominant tendency of viewing nature as a
self-existing, untouched entity, instead of one that is historically produced by and
fundamentally linked to human activity and labor. These statements can also be read as
claims to a local form of ecological nationalism, in which the right to place is asserted
through a discourse of lived landscape, nature intimacy, and stewardship (Cederlof &
Sivaramakrishnan, 2006).
To support this assertion of local sovereignty based on a historically grounded, indigenous
conservation, Shimshalis further point out the state’s incompetence in conserving nature:
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We have inhabited and tended this difficult terrain for centuries. What does the DFO or the
consultant know about conservation? A while back, a park official came and told us that we need
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and give up the rights to our territory for the KNP so
that wildlife habitats can be protected. I told him, “Come, I will show you the area where we
have protected wildlife.” And he responded, “I don’t think I can trek that far.” Then I politely
asked him, “If you cannot walk to the area, how will you ever conserve it?”
In areas where the KNP has been implemented, hunting by state officials has become more
common and convenient. This is why the wildlife populations have decreased in these areas. And
now the government is putting more pressure on us to accept the park so that wildlife in our
areas can be exploited.
4

Such statements assert a local aptitude for conservation that is presented as superior to that
5

of state institutions and international organizations, and also challenge the common
portrayal of Shimshalis as incapable stewards of nature (Butz, 1998). This is significant, as
the discourse of the state and conservation NGOs in the Northern Areas is centered
precisely on problematizing the lack of local “capacity” in attaining conservation goals,
which helps to justify an international organization’s own role in creating, planning, and
managing state-owned conservation zones. My point is not to romanticize the local
community, and its interest and capability in conservation. Rather, I wish to point out that
conservation agencies in the Northern Areas assume a priori that local communities lack
credibility and experience with respect to conservation. They also do not research whether
community practices might have a positive role in wildlife conservation in areas where
there remain sizable numbers of rare species.
The tendency to undervalue the role of local communities in sustaining nature has indeed
been a constitutive feature of global conservation discourse. It is assumed that natives lack
ecological values that are supposedly the preserve only of Western elites (Gareau, 2007).
The nature–society relation in communities across continents has come to be described
through “degradation narratives” that perpetuate the stereotype of an essentialized,
irresponsible native—often without the support of any scientific analysis—as they help to
justify national and international interventions for protecting the “global commons” from its
local users (Brockington & Homewood, 2001; Neumann, 2004). These narratives emerged
from, and build upon a long-standing colonial discourse that helped to legitimize the
appropriation of nature for varied interests including commercial exploitation, hunting
pleasure, and strategic needs (Rangarajan, 2006). Today, they continue to thrive in
conservation discourse, despite the rhetoric of including and valorizing the “local
community.”
Representation and Power: The Case of the Shimshal Nature Trust

Until the mid-90s, Shimshali villagers obstructed the implementation of the KNP through
informal resistances such as the disruption of information-gathering

Exhibit 5.2 A Village Settlement in Central Shimshal.

mechanisms, refusal to follow administrative regulations, and the blocking of government
and NGO officials from entering the community (Butz, 2002). However, the pressures on
them to submit to park authorities kept increasing, as new programs and funds for
conservation poured into the Northern Areas in the wake of a renewed global—and
subsequently, national—concern for biodiversity preservation. In this context, the
confrontational stance of Shimshalis that emphasized a complete rejection of the park was
proving to be counterproductive, and served only to reinforce the stereotype of Shimshal as
a backward and “wild” community. Realizing this, a group of men belonging mostly to
Shimshal’s first generation English-educated elite—and often employed in development
NGOs based in Gilgit or Islamabad—began to rally community members around a politics
of appeasement and engagement, instead of one that endorsed confrontation. They strongly
felt—and feared—that a small, marginal border community like Shimshal could eventually
suffer massive state action unless it was able to counter its negative image, and negotiate
cordially with conservation organizations. As one of them said to me, they had to “fight
with dialogue.” After much deliberation, they came up with an answer: a community-based
organization called the Shimshal Nature Trust (SNT) that would manage and showcase
Shimshal’s conservation efforts, and represent the community in dealings with external
organizations.
6
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Created in 1997, the key purpose of the SNT was to formally articulate, and give material
force to the representational claims discussed in the previous section—claims to livelihood
dependency, native authenticity and ownership, environmental responsibility, and a placebased conservation capability. As the “Fifteen Year Vision and Management Plan” of the
SNT explains:
Our largest challenge is not to develop a system of utilizing the natural surroundings sustainably,
but rather to express our indigenous stewardship practices in language that will garner the
financial, technical and political support of the international community, and that will persuade
Pakistani authorities that we are indeed capable of protecting our own natural surroundings
(SNT, 1999).

The SNT “management plan” is precisely a response to this representational challenge: how
to counter the language, and hence, the power of a global conservation discourse that
refuses to acknowledge indigenous values and rights? The plan describes the socioeconomic context of the Shimshali community, the ways in which a conservation ethic has
been historically practiced, and the community-initiated programs through which natural
resource management is envisioned in the future. Following the tropes of developmentalist
writing, these programs are divided up into implementation phases, with various activities
planned for each phase. The SNT management plan has been distributed to all the major
government and non-governmental organizations working on conservation and
development in the Northern Areas, and is also accessible through the Internet. Between
1999 and 2002, SNT members also conducted a series of “workshops” in Gilgit with
different “stakeholders” to create awareness and legitimacy for their approach toward
conservation.
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The very language, format, and content of SNT practices reflect how communities have
come to understand and reconfigure the nature of the power exercised by international
conservation organizations. The global discourse of “community-based nature
conservation” and “sustainable development” is appropriated by positing Shimshalis as the
original and most suitable conservationists, who are equipped to ensure the sustainable
future that international conservation NGOs are striving toward. Moreover, the
“participatory” approach adopted by NGOs in recent years—in part a response to the failure
of and resistance to earlier development projects—is reconstituted to argue that effective
participation must entail complete ownership. As the management plan explains:
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While we appreciate recent efforts by external agencies to develop [a] community-based nature
conservation project…it is not enough that external initiatives be managed locally; rather, a
culturally and contextually-sensitive nature stewardship programme should be developed and
initiated, as well as managed, from within the community (SNT, 1997).

The existence and legitimacy of such a community-centered program is then established by
describing how indigenous ways of environmental management have historically been
based on ecologically sound practices such as land use zoning, as well as on culturally

specific values such as the “Islamic religious ethic of nature stewardship” in which nature is
respected as “God’s ultimate creation” (SNT, 1997). The emphasis on such a moral ecology
grounded in religion has an important discursive effect—it provides a way to unsettle the
scientific authority of international conservation agencies by highlighting how the
interpretation of nature and its conservation through ethical values is more locally
appropriate and signifi cant than one based on scientific principles. However, this is not to
suggest that religious and cultural practice does not have any real role in local systems of
nature conservation. On the contrary, long-standing religious and cultural institutions have
enabled Shimshalis—who follow the Ismaili sect of Islam—to collectively organize for
conservation efforts ranging from hunting control to pasture management. The SNT itself is
managed partly by local volunteer corps and boy scouts, who are affiliated with the jamat
khana (religious center) in Ismaili-Muslim practice.
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While the key purpose of SNT is a strategic celebration and vindication of an indigenous,
ecological sovereignty, the role of external support is also valued. Indeed, as SNT members
emphasize, foreign scholars from universities in Japan, Canada, and the United States have
played a critical role in shaping local consciousness and enabling community initiatives.
The SNT also acknowledges that for activities such as a wildlife census and wildlife
monitoring, the support of organizations like the WWF and IUCN is especially needed and
welcomed.
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Unfortunately, such collaborations have rarely materialized, as international conservation
organizations continue to insist that any project of conservation in Shimshal must be linked
to the conversion of community-owned land into the KNP. Even if it is now occasionally
acknowledged—as the new rhetoric of respecting the “community” demands—that
Shimshalis have responsibly taken care of the environment, it is argued matter-of-factly that
their main livelihood practice of livestock grazing poses a fundamental threat to wildlife
survival, and hence they cannot be trusted with the task of conservation.
Reorienting Livelihoods

The ban on livestock grazing in the Khunjerab National Park was marginally enforced until
1989, when the newly formed government organization—the National Council for
Conservation of Wildlife (NCCW)—drafted a plan for a stricter enforcement of the
Category II criteria. Th e affected villages nevertheless continued to practice their
customary grazing rights, particularly since the government was not forthcoming with the
promised compensation. Things came to a head in 1991, when the government used the
paramilitary Khunjerab Security Force to evict herdsmen from the park’s no-grazing zone
and even killed some of their livestock. Eventually, in 1992, all the aggrieved communities
except Shimshal signed an agreement with the KNP authorities that allowed them some
concessions on their grazing rights as well a share in park-generated revenue in return for
accepting the authority of the park (Knudsen, 1999).

While the ban on livestock grazing was somewhat relaxed, it soon gave way to a new
emphasis on a reduction in livestock holdings. This reduction has in effect become a precondition for obtaining the community share in park-generated revenue such as entry fees.
In fact, as a state wildlife official informed me, the very point of sharing the park revenue
with the community is to enable them to engage in “conservation activities such as the
reduction of their livestock over a period of time.”
In recent years, this new logic of equating community conservation with livestock reduction
has meant that park officials have withheld payment of the community share in KNP’s entry
fees for long periods on the grounds that the concerned communities are not reducing their
livestock holdings. Despite strong evidence of decreasing livestock ownership and grazing
in the Northern Areas (Kreutzmann, 2006), KNP offi cials continue to claim otherwise.
Such a claim about livestock holdings has thus become a tool in the hands of KNP officials
to retain their hold over communities and their resources.
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Conservation NGOs, on the other hand, concede that dependence on livestock herding is
indeed decreasing in areas affecting the KNP. This, however, does not necessarily bring any
credit for the community. As a manager at an international conservation NGO remarked:
Communities are not reducing their livestock because they care about conservation. It is
happening itself because people are increasingly seeking off-farm employment. It is only when
they will consciously reduce livestock that we will achieve true community participation.

In other words, it is not just particular conservation outcomes that are desired; rather, a
disciplining of community attitudes is being struggled for, and represented as the legitimate
form of participation. Community participation is thus reconfigured as a measure of how
well people in the Northern Areas have internalized the international conservation
discourse, and sacrificed their own livelihoods for its sake.

Because it is believed that communities are not “participating” well, international
conservation organizations have sought to go beyond the process of awareness-raising
regarding the negative impact of livestock on wildlife conservation. They wish to actively
steer people away from livestock herding by providing alternate sources of income (WWF,
1996). These alternate livelihoods must ideally be linked to the implementation of the park,
so that people can realize that conservation can be a source of their “development” as
opposed to pastoralism. Linking the global project of conservation to “income-generating
opportunities” at the local level has become known as “community-based conservation” in
the discourse of international conservation NGOs operating in the Northern Areas, and it is
to its contested operations that I now turn my attention.

Community-Based Conservation

For international conservation NGOs in the Northern Areas, community-based conservation
has become synonymous with projects of ecotourism and the international sport of trophy
hunting. The latter has particularly come to dominate the conservation scene in the Northern
Areas over the last ten years, during which twenty-two “Community Controlled Hunting
Areas” (CCHAs) have been created in the region. These have been established primarily by
IUCN, through the GEF/UNDP funded Mountain Areas Conservancy Project (MACP). The
CCHAs have a strong appeal for communities, as 75 percent of the revenue generated
through trophy hunting goes to the community that manages the relevant area.
Communities also earn income through the porters and guides that accompany the hunter.
Moreover, hunters are also known to be generous, and might give up to $3000 as a donation
for local development after a successful hunt.
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International conservation organizations in the Northern Areas promote trophy hunting as a
form of “sustainable community development” because of the cash it generates, which is
either distributed evenly to all the households in a village, or saved with a recognized
community-based organization that can utilize the funds for local development projects. It
is also represented as a useful tool for conservation: the income that can be generated by
occasionally catering to the needs of rich Pakistani and foreign hunters is deemed to be a
significant disincentive for rampant local hunting which might be undertaken for
subsistence, cultural significance, pleasure, or trade.
Conservation agencies perceive no contradiction between projects such as the KNP that
seek to preserve landscapes in their “natural state” for the protection of wildlife, and
projects such as the CCHAs that turn this wildlife into a commodity that can be killed for
pleasure. In many cases, a CCHA is in fact located right along the boundaries of a national
park, in what is called the “buffer zone.” It is assumed that the hunting of treasured wildlife
in these buffer zones does not disrupt their natural habitats, but the practice of livestock
grazing and local hunting does. In effect, local use values of nature are delegitimized in
order to secure its global exchange value.
This commodification of nature in the name of conservation is perfectly aligned with the
interests of hunters. As trophy hunting faces increased resistance in North America and
Europe, “hunters, like multinational industries, flee to grounds where they can escape those
restrictive conditions” (MacDonald, 2005, p. 266). The continuation of their sport, however,
is dependent on the protection of wildlife in these freer areas from local use and abuse. This
link between local conservation and global hunting is captured tellingly in a Safari Club
International (SFI) sticker which I saw at the head office of a prominent international
conservation organization in the Northern Areas. It read: “Conserve Now, Hunt Later.” No
wonder that conservation agencies perceive no contradiction between saving nature and
selling it: they want nature to be saved precisely so that it can be sold.

Community-based trophy hunting also serves the interests of the state, and particularly of
the local forest bureaucracy that oversees the management of protected areas. It provides an
important source of revenue, and also reinforces the power of the state to distribute
patronage through the granting of hunting quotas to particular communities. This serves as
an indirect means for regulating community behavior. Indeed, the KNP management has
used trophy hunting as a lure to put pressure on Shimshalis for giving ownership of their
land to the KNP. As a KNP official explained:
In 2006, we gave a permit to an American hunter to hunt in Shimshal. The community got its
due share for the trophy as well. We then allowed the creation of a Community Controlled
Hunting Area as an additional incentive. Since then, we have given more permits, but we will
not release the money till Shimshalis sign an MoU in which they accept the KNP and its
regulations. We have to bring these communities in line. They think they can extract the benefits
of the park, without obeying the writ of the government.

Hence, community-based conservation schemes that provide a community share in trophy
hunting and in park entry fees, have come to perpetuate a state–community relation in
which the very terms of participation are based on exclusion and dispossession, as they
require communities to surrender ownership of their land on the one hand and abandon their
livelihoods on the other. These projects have become forms of political and social control
that help to entrench the power of the state over rural spaces and communities. This control
is often asserted through sinister tactics. For example, in 2006, the Directorate of the
Khunjerab National Park lodged a court case against a number of Shimshali youth for
assaulting park rangers who had been sent to Shimshal. Members of the SNT, however,
contend that there was only a verbal argument between the rangers and local youth, and that
the case has been filed only to malign Shimshalis and further coerce them into accepting the
authority of the KNP.
Analyses of community-based conservation initiatives elsewhere have likewise
demonstrated how environmental agendas framed in participatory terms have served to
intensify state power, often diminishing the political and economic security of rural
communities instead of enhancing it (Neumann, 2001; Agrawal, 2001a; Li, 2002; Breunig,
2006). These agendas are defined by a dense network of national and transnational actors
that cut across the traditional divides of state, non-governmental organization, and
corporation (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). What is truly baffling and dangerous about the
global conservation agenda is its insistence on promoting activities such as tourism and
trophy hunting—which commodify nature primarily for the leisure of rich, Western
consumers—as sustainable alternatives to local subsistence-based livelihoods. In this neoliberal logic, the “sustainable development” of a community becomes equated with the
ability to raise cash incomes through the market, and the development of “nature” is
presumed to be achieved by turning it into a commodity that is subject to market forces of
production and exchange. Such logics cannot be implemented without the necessary
cultivation and appropriation of local subjectivities. Through promises of “benefit-sharing,”
already marginal, local communities are first expected to compromise their own livelihood

concerns and take on the burden of conserving “nature,” and then led to treat nature as a
resource from which they can and must profit from.
The appeal and importance of such market-driven approaches to nature management for
local communities should not be underestimated. In a context where the state is pushing for
park development but shows very little interest in social development, communities like
Shimshal tremendously value the revenue that they may get from projects like trophy
hunting, as it can be directed for self-help initiatives ranging from water channels to health
care provision. What they find problematic, however, is the contingency of “communitybased conservation” schemes on relinquishing the very land and livelihood on which
communities are founded.
The discourse of “alternative livelihoods” is also problematic because it assumes that a
pastoral community’s relationship with nature is merely about economic need, and hence
alternative sources of incomes would, and should automatically translate into a reduced
dependence on nature—ideally, a total surrender of it so that it becomes a “protected area”
for state and capital. What is erased in such a discourse is the central role of nature and
pastoral activity in defining a community’s identity and its forms of belonging. In Shimshal,
for example, pastures are considered key sites for historical events, spiritual renewal, and
cultural celebrations (Butz, 1996). They are also particularly cherished by Shimshali
women as places that provide respite from the constraints and anxieties of village life, by
offering a meaningful experience of independence, female solidarity, and peace. Hence,
what is considered a “natural” terrain of pristine wildlife is of tremendous material and
symbolic value for Shimshalis (Moore, 1993), encompassing identity, history, and
livelihood. Utlimately, it is the very source and meaning of life, which is why both its
commodification and compensation is considered unthinkable.
Conclusion

Ten years after the establishment of the Shimshal Nature Trust, a number of SNT members
expressed to me a sense of disillusionment about their initiative. As one of them
commented:
We created the SNT to engage with outside interests, and make them understand our concerns.
Instead, we have become perceived as more of a threat, and portrayed as anti-state. This is
completely false. We are eager to work with the state, and with international NGOs. We know
that conservation is important. All we are saying is, don’t make a park that will prevent us from
owning our lands and living our lives.

These were the last impressions with which I left Shimshal in June 2007. By March 2008,
however, the tide had changed. Shimshalis had managed to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Northern Areas Wildlife and Parks Department, which clearly
acknowledged and guaranteed the land use rights and settlements of Shimshal, in return for
cooperation in transnational and national conservation eff orts—something Shimshalis were

always prepared to do, but on their own terms. Subsequently, the Khunjerab National Park
authorities have also withdrawn their criminal charges against Shimshali youth. Shimshal
Nature Trust members now speak with a sense of relief and hope, instead of frustration and
fear. It can thus be argued that the epistemic “struggle for interpretive power” (Franco,
1989)—which Shimshalis engaged in through the Shimshal Nature Trust—was ultimately
successful, though the future course of interactions between Shimshal, state actors, and
international institutions remains to be seen.
The case of Shimshal embodies a critical struggle for social and ecological justice,
contributing to peasant struggles elsewhere that have sought to reclaim rural agency in
global development projects (McMichael, 2006). Such struggles create an opening for
alternate visions of being and becoming. Indeed, Shimshalis hope to change the dominant
“global” discourse on conservation itself, by arguing that they themselves are central
makers of the development project instead of its beneficiaries, and that they are eager to
imagine new social futures with “government participation” and “international
participation.” This challenges the existing framework whereby epistemic and material
powers are concentrated in the hands of a transnational–national nexus of institutions, the
agendas of which are scripted from above while allowing “community participation.” In
effect, like indigenous communities elsewhere, Shimshalis are working toward an
ecological sovereignty in which their community governs itself and sustainably tends the
resources on which it depends—as it has always done.
Despite the Shimshali achievement, however, the normative narrative of biodiversity
conservation remains wedded to projects that act in the name of community, but are
unwilling to listen to it. Indeed, what I have tried to point out in this chapter is not only the
unwillingness, but the structural inability of the global conservation nexus to understand
and value the interests of local communities. Embedded in the global discourse of
biodiversity conservation and sustainable development are assumptions— for example,
about nature as divorced from society, and livestock as an irredeemable threat to wildlife—
and interests such as those of conservation organizations, their corporate financiers, and
hunters, which make it unthinkable to acknowledge that a local community can own and
manage a protected area. What gets authorized, instead, is the commodification of nature
which
abstracts nature from its spatial and social contexts…reinforces the claims of global elites to the
greatest share of the earth’s biomass and all it contains…and speeds the extension of market
relations into diverse and complex eco-social systems, with material and cultural outcomes that
do more to diminish than to conserve diversity and sustainability (McAfee, 1999, pp. 1–3).

This process of commodification has simultaneously enhanced the power of the state to
territorialize nature and to regulate subjects through the control of nature. The end result of
this process is that almost 40 percent of the Northern Areas’ territory has been declared as

some form of conservation enclosure, benefiting state and capital at the cost of local
sovereignty and livelihood.
To be sure, my critique of community-based conservation is not aimed at dismissing the
participatory turn in global development and biodiversity conservation. This turn is surely a
necessary corrective to earlier approaches which were characterized by a top-down
imposition of agendas and frequent use of violence. Indeed, it is precisely the rhetoric of
“participation” and “community empowerment” that enables negotiation on the part of
Shimshalis. At the same time, however, we need to recognize the ways in which such
rhetoric facilitates and conceals the manipulation, violence, and displacement that is still
widespread in conservation practice.
I also do not wish to suggest that the role of conservation organizations in the Northern
Areas has been entirely negative. Both the WWF and IUCN are staffed with several local
managers who are all too aware of the dilemmas that conservation poses for their region
and people, and have pushed their supervisors to be more sensitive to local contexts. These
organizations have also undertaken important initiatives that address local needs of
conservation, such as training of communities in restoring pastures, in protecting livestock
from predators, and in addressing concerns of deforestation and overhunting. Importantly,
they have also attempted to go beyond the draft ing of management plans for protected
areas, to undertaking valuable research on topics such as local understandings of ecology
and wildlife management.
Initiatives such as these have the potential to promote a more meaningful attention to the
“local” in conservation practice. For example, a report by IUCN (2003) examines
customary and statutory regimes of resource control in the Northern Areas, arguing that the
former favors conservation and sustainability whereas the latter promotes exploitation. It
further explores how communities in the Northern Areas have had a varying historical
experience of nature–society relations, and how differently situated actors within
communities offer diverse explanations for declining wildlife populations. People point out
that road construction, urbanization, and less rainfall due to climate change have been key
threats to wildlife survival in their regions. While acknowledging that local hunting has
been a threat, they also highlight how it has increased only in the last two decades due to
the availability of modern weapons as well as the pressures of new market-generated
economic needs.
Importantly, not one person in this comprehensive study argues that livestock is a threat to
wildlife. This reinforces the findings of my own fieldwork in Shimshal, which revealed how
people perceive wildlife and livestock populations as part of a complex ecological process
in which a complementary relationship between plant, animal, and human life has been
historically developed and maintained by local communities. From their perspective, they
have been conserving all along and cannot understand why they must discontinue their
practices for the sake of conservation. A shepherd from southern France has poignantly
echoed this sentiment: “shepherds…are trapped between the desire to do what they know

and want to do and the requirement to act as a manager of space and biodiversity. The most
difficult thing is perhaps to explain that, all told, this is one and the same approach”
(Grellier, 2006, p. 163).
Such reflections on biodiversity invite and enable a deeper analysis of environmental issues
than that permitted by the dominant conservation discourse that pits local irresponsibility
against global concerns. One hopes that for the cause of environmental sustainability as
well as of social justice, such local understandings, values, and aspirations are not only
researched, but actually allowed a central place in framing the agenda of biodiversity
conservation as well as in shaping the future of development.
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1
However, it entails the nationalization of community land instead of its privatization as Harvey
posits.
2
“Exclusive” in the sense that only villagers of Shimshal own and manage this vast terrain. The
administrative role of the local or the national state has historically been limited, largely due to the rugged,
inaccessible terrain of Shimshal. Shimshalis used to pay grazing taxes during the Mir’s reign, but after the
abolition of the Hunza princely state in 1974, no income taxes have been paid to the Pakistan government.
3
Abbreviation for the District Forest Officer, the key government official responsible for
implementing state policies of conservation in the Northern Areas.
4
The occurrence of illegal hunting by state officials in the KNP has even been acknowledged by
the WWF, which is the main international organization that has been pushing for the formalization of the
park (WWF, 1996). Moreover, a higher-up official at WWF also acknowledged to me in a personal
interview that “wildlife in Shimshal is most likely being conserved well.”
5
Research elsewhere in South Asia has also demonstrated that replacing local forms of control
with state control is not always productive for conserving nature, because the state is generally unable to
enforce its own conservation policies (Guha, 1989, Saberwal, 1999, Agrawal, 2001b).
6
A town of around 50,000 people that serves as the administrative center of the Northern Areas.
7
Their intervention was openly vilified at first, particularly by some notable village elders who
accused them of being bought by the state and conservation NGOs.
8
These programs include a community-enforced ban on wildlife hunting which was discussed
earlier in this article. Keeping local needs in mind, the ban does not apply to the small number of ibex that
are hunted for meat by yak herders in the winter.
9
Indeed, due to the unequal power relations embedded in global conservation regimes, indigenous
communities around the world have had to re-present themselves as environmentally responsible subjects
to ensure their survival (Martinez-Alier, 2002). This suggests that a claim to traditional property rights and
livelihood dependency has increasingly become insuffi cient for preventing the appropriation of their
rights.
10
At the same time, a scientific approach is also drawn upon by asserting that nature conservation
by the Shimshal community would be based, in the first place, on up-to-date statistical information
collected by local youth.
11
The SNT management plan itself was compiled and edited by David Butz, a geographer who has
been working in Shimshal since 1988.

12
These communities do not include Shimshal; they belong to the seven Upper Hunza villages that
accepted the authority of the park, and are hence, entitled to a share in park revenue.
13
The cost of a hunting permit varies with different wildlife species: for an ibex it is $3000, for a
blue sheep it is $6500, and shooting an Astore Markhor can cost up to $40,000.

